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Abstract
This paper introduces the increasing use of share buybacks in western countries 
with different motivations especially on the part of top management. After exploring the 
impact of share buybacks on earnings per share and cash, the paper critically examines if 
it is really a payout in order to return money to shareholders as claimed by some compa-
nies. In many cases, there are some traces of management’s hidden motivation to use 
share buyback to their interest rather than the interest of minority shareholders, because 
most of the decisions are flexible giving choice to management.  Finally, the paper sug-
gests shareholders and investors to be careful in making share buyback decisions, and 
recommends regulatory authorities to be alert and protect the shareholders by tightening 
their legislation and regulations.
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INTRODUCTION
According to Santicola (2011), there
has been a shift in payout policy over the
last 15 years with firms opting to conduct
stock repurchases over paying dividends.
For this paper, stock repurchase or share
buyback or acquiring treasury stock means
repurchase of shares by the issuing com-
pany regardless of the purpose, and these
terms would be used interchangeably.
Ikenberry D. L. and Vermaelen T. (1996)
reports that during 1980s and early 1990s,
thousands of US firms announced open
market share repurchase programs. Thus,
the number of firms that pay dividends has
fallen and the number of stock repurchases
has increased (Brav, Graham, Harvey,and
Michaely [2004] and Fama and French
[2001]). In this paper, the authors plan to
differentiate between share buyback and
dividend payment under payout policy, but
have no intention to discuss about the sub-
stitution effect; however, the authors want
to focus on the flexibility of share buyback
programs.
DIFFERENT MOTIVATIONS OF
SHARE BUYBACK
On the part of management, there are
different motivations for a share buyback
program. Michel, Oded, and Shaked
(2010) summarized motivations including
signaling undervaluation, payout of free
cash, share price support, takeover deter-
rence, earnings per share (EPS) enhance-
ment, and prevention of dilution resulting
from executive compensation. For ex-
ample, the purpose of share buyback pro-
gram as authorized by the Fiat Group’s
shareholders’ general meeting on April 5,
2007 was to service stock option plans and
to invest surplus funds. (Annual Report,
2007)
Again, they roughly classify the meth-
ods of share buyback as open market re-
purchase (OMR), tender offer and Accel-
erated share repurchase (ASR). Open mar-
ket repurchase is a traditional method that
usually makes a non-committing arrange-
ment; then starts buying in the open mar-
ket which usually takes one to three years
to complete. Quicker than OMR, tender
offer needs to pay a premium above mar-
ket price depending on the urgency of the
program. Like tender offer, accelerated
share repurchase (ASR) is quicker but still
needs some months to complete and to pay
fees to an investment bank for their par-
ticipation (Michel et al., 2000).
IMPACT ON EARNINGS PER
SHARE (EPS)
A rise in the EPS is one of the spin-offs
of share buyback provided that there is no
change in earnings or a decrease in earn-
ings proportionately lower than the rela-
tive decrease in number of shares outstand-
ing.  Proponents of share buyback used to
present it as an advantage of attracting the
investors, but this advantage is only super-
ficial because substantively it does not re-
flect the profitability or management effec-
tiveness. To evaluate the real EPS conser-
vatively, it would be advisable to use the
number of shares issued (i.e. without the
number of buyback shares) because vari-
ableness of number of buyback shares
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program by management. At this juncture,
the question is the sustainability of the cash
surplus whether it would be temporary or
permanent. There is also another question
if the management has ability to determine
the cash surplus status. Even if it is deter-
mined to be a permanent surplus, it cannot
be treated as the last resort to buy back
shares since there are so many alternatives
to make use of it. A cash-rich entity could
think about investment portfolios, focus-
ing on research for future survival, mod-
ernizing the technology, etc. It could give
not only huge dividends but also special
dividends as done by Apple in the past be-
fore cash was badly needed for new inven-
tions and investment.
Even when there was definitely cash
surplus, many leading corporations tried to
preserve it without bothering ways to re-
duce them. For decades before 2008 re-
cession and afterwards, U.S. companies
had been compiling cash with the result that
in November 2010, Microsoft alone had
$43 billion cash followed by Cisco with
$39.9 billion cash, to name a few. The main
motivation was to serve for contingency
using cash to hedge against risk
(Schneiderman, R.M. and Ralph, J. A.,
2011). Thus, it is questionable if spending
surplus cash, including share buyback, is
really a wise business decision.
Whatever the reason, real or imagina-
tive, the approval of the general meeting
of shareholders for share buyback can eas-
ily be obtained if the majority of shares are
held or represented by top management.
Hsieh, J. and Wang, Q. (2008) state that
management recommends payout decisions
to the board of directors who in turn re-
view and approved the proposed policy.
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would affect the credibility of EPS. The 
original assumption of calculating EPS is 
that the buyback shares are not eligible to 
the earnings. However, there is a possibil-
ity that those shares could be sold back in 
the market again.
Traditionally, EPS is a simple indica-
tor from the point of view of a shareholder, 
and the figure could be easily looked in the 
daily announcement of stock market. A 
superficial investor can be easily swayed 
by a high or PER which remains constant 
at least for a quarter or up to one year un-
til net income figure of a new year is con-
firmed.
On the other side, a rising EPS could 
create a fall in price earnings ratio (PER) 
provided market price remains constant or 
price increase is proportionately less than 
EPS increase. Besides, PER’s effect is dif-
ferent depending on the status of an inves-
tor whether s/he is a buyer or a seller. The 
rise in PER is not favorable to a buyer es-
pecially it is coupled with the price rise, 
unless the entity is fundamentally prospec-
tive.  However, it is favorable to a seller. 
When PER falls coupled with EPS rises, 
the buyer would have an advantage. The 
seller would have the opposite effect in 
each case. Trying to manipulate EPS by 
share buyback is tantamount to create ad-
vantage for the remaining (loyal) share-
holders (mainly management holding the 
majority shares) by using the money of all 
shareholders.
IMPACT ON CASH
Frequently, surplus cash was often cited 
as a reason for adopting a share buyback
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Moreover, these payout decisions are less
subject to shareholders’ scrutiny and rarely
regulated. However, at the time of the ap-
proval or at the time of implementation of
the program, the financial status of an en-
tity may be high-leveraged, incurring high
interest expenses and even low times in-
terest earned (TIE). A study by Lee C-H,
Hsieh C., and Peng X. (2005) finds that
real estate investment trusts appear to fi-
nance stock repurchases by issuing new
debt and/or selling assets or investments,
instead of using funds from operations.
Kook (2010) also maintains that share re-
purchases use up excess funds, divert funds
from internal investments, or cause the firm
to incur debt. It is unrealistic to buy back
shares while an entity has a large long-term
debt, not to talk about short-term. More-
over, it is unreasonable to borrow money
to finance share buyback. In fact, availabil-
ity of surplus cash is only a condition for
using cash but should not be a justification
or motivation for share buyback.
The real motivation could come from
the discretionary nature of management to
serve their interest over those of minority
shareholders. There are different motiva-
tions of management at different times,
especially when their bonuses and stock
options are linked to EPS. The approval
of a share buyback program by general
meeting of shareholders authorized by
boards usually covers a large number of
shares over a certain period as long as three
years not only gives managers discretion
as to when to acquire shares, but also
whether to buy back the number of shares
authorized (Ikenberry, D.L. and Vermaelen
T., 1996), ultimately like a blank check to
be used by management.
Especially, share buyback through open
market repurchase (OMR) has no firm
commitment on the part of management
which, after receiving authority from the
board and the annual meeting, waits for the
opportunity of their interest to respond
quickly. The management just wants to be
in a position to legally purchase when the
situation is right. Some of the programs
are not started, and not all programs are
fully completed (Ikenberry et al. 1998). The
management is allowed flexibility to act
such because the share prices may change
from expectation at the time of authoriza-
tion of the program. Share buybacks using
OMRs are optional and often only partially
executed because OMR takes more time
to complete than other methods (Michel
et al., 2010). It is normally assumed that
management needs to act for the interest
of the entity. According to Stephens and
Weisbach (1998), only 70-80 percent of the
announced value in OMRs is on average
actually repurchased, and 5 percent of an-
nouncing companies does not repurchase
any shares.
Of course, accelerated share repur-
chases (ASR) are more committed and
more credible than OMR, but lack flexibil-
ity in such a way that they have to bear the
price risks.
Ikenberry et al. (1996) observes that
thousands of firms that adopted share
buyback programs never completed them
for several reasons. In fact, the decision to
exercise buyback requires company re-
sources, especially cash. While companies
with excess debt capacity, excess cash, few
growth opportunities, and potential
mispricing would be able to exercise the
program, all other companies will follow a
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As share buyback programs definitely
reduce the cash balance, all cash related
ratios will be affected, most of them unfa-
vorably. To elaborate, it will drag down
working capital, current ratio, quick ratio,
free cash flow and financial flexibility but
pop up cash turnover ratio. As an illustra-
tion, an impact flow chart of share buyback
is shown on the next page.
Impact Flow Chart of Share Buyback
Use of Cash Surplus
*Other Alternatives Share Buyback
Equity __No. of shares __ Cash __
D/E ratio +Future dividends __ WC __
ROE +EPS + CR __
BV__ QR __
PER __
FCF __
FF __
Abbreviations:  EPS = Earnings per share, PER = price earning
ratio, D/E = Debtequity ratio, ROE = Return on equity, BV = Book
value, WC = Working capital, CR = current ration, QR = Quick ratio,
FCF = Free cash flow, FF = Financial flexibility, CTO = Cash turn-
over ratio.
Invesdtors, wealth +
*Other alternatives:  1. Dividend pay-
ment 2. Expansion program 3. Reduc-
tion of financial leverage 4. Investment
portfolio 5. Cash reserveShares Price +
CTO +
Takeover charce __
+ = Increase; __ = Decrease
p
p
p
p
p
p
p
p
p
p
p
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wait-to-adopt approach.
The management may defend about the 
flexibility of share buyback program that 
can allow it to sell back those shares in the 
market, hopefully at a profit. Ironically, it 
could happen that the need to sell back 
shares comes at the time the business is 
failing and share prices are falling. It is also 
possible that hunters for take-over targets 
may be waiting for that opportunity.
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“RETURNING MONEY BACK TO
SHAREHOLDERS”
Another argument from the proponents
of share buyback program is that sharehold-
ers’ money is returned to them in a similar
effect as the payment of dividends. Of
course, it is undeniable that money is re-
turned to shareholders; except that simi-
larity there is nothing to compare between
share buyback program and dividend pay-
ment.
Dividend payment is a regular activity
for a normally successful entity, especially
the one that disburses every quarter under
a dividend policy and the same level of pay-
out ratio as far as financial conditions al-
low. But share buyback is a phase-by-phase
program covering more than one year.
Again, the coverage of dividend payment
is an indiscriminating obligation covering
all the shareholders whereas the impact of
share buyback program is only for those
selected shareholders who decide to relin-
quish their shares. Moreover, the amount
disbursed as dividend per share is usually
less than par value or originally purchased
price while the amount offered for buying
back each share is usually around current
price, but probably higher. After all, the big
difference is that dividends shareholders
still retain their right as the owners of the
entity, and could expect dividends for the
coming years until liquidation or until they
sell out their shares.
For the share buyback program, once
shareholders sell back their shares, they
relinquish their rights as owners including
over future dividends of the entity. In fact,
the management expels the shareholders by
giving a fair compensation mostly out of
shareholders’ own investment that had been
accumulated for a number of years. To be
blunt, the management representing the
majority shareholders expels minority
shareholders by using the money inside the
entity, but not out of their own pocket. In
fact, the management needs not return
money back to shareholders except in the
form of dividends. If the shareholders need
cash for any reason, they can sell their
shares easily in the market at any favor-
able time and for any required amount.
In one way, it can be treated as internal
take-over eliminating the risk of internal
revolt. Of course, there are knowledgeable
independent directors in the board of di-
rectors who can object if they have a heart
to, but as long as the entity’s internal rules
(like articles of association) permit, and
securities and exchange commission’s
regulations allow, they may not be that se-
rious to object that kind of program. One
can still argue that majority of the share-
holders may also sell part of their shares in
the program, but that could be possible so
long as it would not affect their majority
position being strengthened by the same
program, and the number of shares would
be naturally negligent.
One of the strongest motivations of
share buyback program is to prevent a hos-
tile take-over. Even the threat of hostile
take-over could be a cautious anxiety or
an imaginary threat, not a real one. By an-
nouncing a share buyback program in
proper timing, the share prices will increase
at least for a certain period. It could also
be a management ploy, to pop up the fall-
ing prices by buying some shares to pro-
voke the market. Nevertheless, preventing
hostile take-over is another way of
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CONCLUSION
From the above observations, analysis
and discussion, it can be concluded as fol-
lows:
1. Share buyback programs are
adopted with various motivations, some of
which declared while others are hidden es-
pecially by management.
2. Share buyback programs could en-
hance earnings per share (EPS) but only
as immediate results, not inherently long-
term. The enhancement is not because of
increase in earnings but because of decrease
in the number of shares outstanding, sim-
ply a denominator effect.
3. On the other hand, such programs
will definitely increase debt/equity ratio,
thereby lifting up the financial leverage, fi-
nally accelerating liquidity and solvency
risks.
4. Practically, such programs are not
the real “pay outs” or “returning money
back to shareholders” like dividends be-
cause these programs eliminate rival or
minority shareholders by giving attractive
prices.
5. Many of such programs are al-
lowed for long periods, sometimes ex-
tended or new programs added giving
chance to management to take advantage.
6. Approving such programs by
shareholders without proper examining,
evaluating and monitoring will be tanta-
mount to giving a blank check to manage-
ment.
7. Such programs are not business op-
erations but just a financial ploy to create
illusion to shareholders or investors.
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strengthening their majority shareholding 
to such a scale that minority shareholders 
could not challenge effectively in annual 
meetings.
It could also be argued that the remain-
ing minority shareholders are also better 
off together with majority shareholders, 
mainly in the sense that the future profits 
are shared among them fairly and equally 
on the basis of their shareholdings. How-
ever, the majority shareholders represent-
ing management still have other advantages 
such as executive bonuses and share op-
tion plans over and above their complete 
control of operations. In fact, they are shar-
ing a shrunk business with low equity base 
due to cash drainage, increasing the debt 
equity ratio. Some of the buyback pro-
grams went so far that the common stock 
portion of equity was even less than the 
value of treasury stocks with a tendency 
to become negative equity but covered up 
by the retained earnings. The reason is the 
very high purchase price (although within 
a certain range of market price) resulting 
in an unreasonable and exorbitant gap be-
tween the par value and purchase price. 
One excuse for share buyback is to use 
surplus cash in the entity but it is a contro-
versial evaluation depending upon the op-
portunities open to the entity, 
management’s vision to expand the busi-
ness and the corporate life cycle that could 
be extended through research and succes-
sive inventions. In this case, the long term 
perspective of the management is question-
able.
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RECOMMENDATIONS:
1. Any securities and exchange com-
mission should consider seriously whether
to allow such programs by the companies
(although it is already a normal practice
around the world).
2. If such programs are already al-
lowed, the financial authorities should con-
sider detail conditions and procedure in
such a way that management be unable to
abuse to their advantage.
3. The shareholders should be aware
of the tricks and traps of management be-
fore giving approval to these proposals.
4. If possible, company legislation
should be upgraded to provide proper pro-
tection for shareholders and stakeholders
in order not to be abused or exploited by
management by using share buyback pro-
grams.
However, the author would like to rec-
ognize that there are some regulating au-
thorities that are serious about protecting
shareholders relating to share buyback pro-
grams, and many companies where man-
agements are sincere about these programs.
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